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Abstract It has been argued that ethically correct robots should be able to reason
about right and wrong. In order to do so, they must have a set of do’s and don’ts at
their disposal. However, such a list may be inconsistent, incomplete or otherwise
unsatisfactory, depending on the reasoning principles that one employs. For this
reason, it might be desirable if robots were to some extent able to reason about their
own reasoning—in other words, if they had some meta-ethical capacities. In this
paper, we sketch how one might go about designing robots that have such capac-
ities. We show that the field of computational meta-ethics can profit from the same
tools as have been used in computational metaphysics.
Keywords Automated moral reasoning  Computational meta-ethics
Introduction
A continually growing number of computers/robots is being deployed on the
battlefield, in hospitals, in law enforcement, in electronic business negotiation and
other ethically sensitive areas. It is desirable that the computers/robots in these areas
behave in an ethically correct manner. It might be argued that they can only be
guaranteed to do so if they can reason about right and wrong on the basis of a set of
moral standards: only ‘‘explicit ethical agents’’ (as they have been called; see Moor
2006) can be expected to behave in an ethically correct manner. However, sets of
moral standards can be inconsistent, incomplete, or inappropriate in view of other
sets of standards; it would therefore desirable that robots equipped with such
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standards were to some extent able to reason about them—in other words, if they
had some capacity for meta-ethical reasoning.
These considerations suggest that when one wants to design ethically correct
robots one should not only explore the field of automated moral reasoning, but also
the field of automated moral meta-reasoning, in the sense of reasoning about moral
reasoning. The development track that we foresee is roughly as follows: informal
moral reasoning (reasoning about obligations, permissions and prohibitions)—
formal moral reasoning (deontic logic)—automated moral reasoning (computational
deontic logic)—automated reasoning about automated moral reasoning (computa-
tional meta-ethics).
Along this development track, the area of automated moral reasoning has already
received some attention. Computational deontic logic has been discussed in the
context of computer-supported computer ethics (Hoven and Lokhorst 2002). This
work has been used in books on the design of moral machines that can distinguish
right from wrong (Wallach and Allen 2008) and engineering autonomous
(unsupervised) moral robots that are capable of carrying out lethal behavior (Arkin
2009). Similar research has been described in papers on moral reasoning by
ethically correct robots (Arkoudas et al. 2005; Bringsjord et al. 2006).
However, the subject of automated moral meta-reasoning has not received much
attention so far. We intend to set some cautious first steps in this area. We are
interested in machines that reason about moral reasoning—meta-ethical robots—for
two reasons. First, it is an intellectual challenge to think about how one might go
about constructing such machines, which might be called philosophical in the sense
that philosophers (inspired by Carnap 1937) are sometimes fond of saying:
‘‘anything you can do, I can do meta.’’ Second, it seems important for practical
applications. Ethical robots need ethical standards. However, these standards may
need examining, either during the design process or in the deployment stage. To the
extent that meta-ethical reasoning can be delegated to computers/robots, the results
will be both more easily obtainable and more reliable than they would be if this
reasoning were left to the humans who design or deploy them.
We will proceed on the assumption that one can use some of the same
computational tools in computational meta-ethics as have been used in computa-
tional metaphysics (Fitelson and Zalta 2007) and in meta-reasoning about different
systems of modal logic (Rabe et al. 2009). We make this assumption because we
have little reason to believe that meta-ethics is essentially different from (let alone
more difficult than) metaphysics or metamathematics.
Design of a Meta-Ethical Robot
Nine Modules
For the purpose of illustration, we envisage a robot with nine modules:
1. Seven non-deontic logical modules.
2. One deontic module.
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3. One meta-logical module.
The seven non-deontic modules have the following functions.
1. Module ST implements system S

T, which we define as the weakest traditionally
strict classical logic closed under strict modus ponens. ST has the same language
as the propositional calculus, except that there is an additional unary connec-
tive square, read as ‘‘necessarily,’’ and the definitions A ! B¼df hðA  BÞ and
A $ B¼dfðA ! BÞ&ðB ! AÞ, where? is strict implication, classical material
implication, and $ strict equivalence. The axioms and rules of inference are as
follows (Chellas and Segerberg 1996):
PL The set of all tautologies.
hPL fhA:A 2 PLg.
US Uniform substitution.
RRSET From A $ B and F to infer FA=B, where FA=B is the result of
replacing one occurrence of A in F by B.
MP From A and A. B to infer B.
SMP From A and A ! B to infer B.
All Lewis systems of strict implication (as studied in Zeman 1973, for
example) are traditionally strict classical logics closed under strict modus
ponens. Some of these systems and the relations between them are as
follows:




 S1  S2  S3  S4  S5:
2. Module Ł@0 implements Łukasiewicz’s infinite-valued logic Ł@0 , which has the
following axioms and rules (Malinowski 2001):
1 A ! ðB ! AÞ
2 ðA ! BÞ ! ððB ! CÞ ! ðA ! CÞÞ
3 ððA ! BÞ ! BÞ ! ððB ! AÞ ! AÞ
4 ðA ! BÞ ! ðB ! AÞ
5 ððA ! BÞ ! ðB ! AÞÞ ! ðB ! AÞ
6 From A and A ! B to infer B.
Definitions: A _ B¼dfðA ! BÞ ! B, A&B¼df ðA _ BÞ, A $ B¼dfðA !
BÞ &ðB ! AÞ. Ł@0 is the weakest of all Łukasiewicz systems, in the sense
that A is a theorem of Ł@0 if and only if A is a theorem of all finite-valued
Łukasiewicz calculi Łn; n 2; n 2 N. Formally, if Th(S) is the set of theorems
of S, then ThðŁ@0Þ ¼
TfThðŁnÞ: n 2; n 2 Ng (Malinowski 2001). These
systems are nowadays popular in the field of fuzzy logic.
3. Module H implements Heyting’s system of intuitionistic logic H, which has the
following axioms and rules (Dalen 2001):
1 A ! ðB ! AÞ
2 ðA ! ðB ! CÞÞ ! ððA ! BÞ ! ðA ! CÞÞ
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3 ðA&BÞ ! A
4 ðA&BÞ ! B
5 ðA ! ðB ! ðA&BÞÞ
6 A ! ðA _ BÞ
7 B ! ðA _ BÞ
8 ðA ! CÞ ! ððB ! CÞ ! ððA _ BÞ ! CÞÞ
9 A ! ðA ! AÞ
10 ðA ! BÞ ! ððA ! BÞ ! AÞ
11 From A and A ! B to infer B. Intuitionistic logic is related to minimal logic,
which we will not study separately.
4. Module R implements relevant system R, which has the following axioms and
rules (Dunn and Restall 2002):
1 A ! A
2 ðA ! BÞ ! ððC ! AÞ ! ðC ! BÞÞ
3 ðA ! ðB ! CÞÞ ! ððA ! BÞ ! ðA ! CÞÞ
4 A ! ððA ! BÞ ! BÞ
5 ðA&BÞ ! A
6 ðA&BÞ ! B
7 ððA ! BÞ&ðA ! CÞÞ ! ðA ! ðB&CÞÞ
8 A ! ðA _ BÞ
9 B ! ðA _ BÞ
10 ððA ! CÞ&ðB ! CÞÞ ! ððA _ BÞ ! CÞ
11 ðA&ðB _ CÞÞ ! ððA&BÞ _ ðA&CÞÞ
12 ðA ! BÞ ! ðB ! AÞ
13  A ! A
14 From A and A ! B to infer B.
15 From A and B to infer A&B. Relevance logic is a predecessor of linear logic,
which we will not study separately.
5. Module RM implements relevant system RM, which is defined as R plus axiom
A ! ðA ! AÞ.
6. Module RM3 implements relevant system RM3, which is defined as R plus
axioms ðA&BÞ ! ðA ! BÞ and A _ ðA ! BÞ (Dunn and Restall 2002).
7. Module KR implements relevant system KR, which is defined as R plus axiom
ðA&AÞ ! B (Dunn and Restall 2002). Systems R, RM, RM3 and KR are
related as follows: R  RM  RM3, R  KR, RM*KR; RM3*KR; KR*
RM; KR*RM3. System KR is famous for being the first relevance logic that
was shown to be undecidable.
The deontic module Mally embodies the principles of Mally’s deontic logic, the
very first system of deontic logic, originally published in 1926 (Lokhorst 2008). We
use the following symbolic language:
– O A: it is obligatory that A.
– u: that which is unconditionally obligatory.
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– rAB¼df A ! OB : A requires B.
Mally’s deontic principles are as follows:
1 ðrAB&ðB ! CÞÞ !rAC
2 ðrAB&rACÞ !rAðB&CÞ
3 rAB $ OðA ! BÞ
4 Ou
5 ru  u
Similar postulates have been proposed by others (Anderson 1967, Castan˜eda 1981).
Mally identified ? with material implication, but we let its logical properties
depend on the context: ? is identical with strict implication in the context of ST,
with Łukasiewicz implication in the context of Ł@0 , with intuitionistic implication in
the context of H, and with relevant implication in the context of R, RM, RM3 and
KR.
Finally, the meta-logical module Meta is the meta-ethical monitor. It selects
suitable logical modules according to the following criteria:
1 Formula T1 A ! OA (if A is the case, then A is obligatory) is undesirable.
2 Formula T2 OA ! A (if A is obligatory, then A is the case) is undesirable.
3 Formula T3 OðA _ BÞ ! ðOA _ OBÞ (if it is obligatory that either A or B, then
either A is obligatory or B is obligatory) is undesirable.
4 Formula D OA ! OA (if A is obligatory, then the negation of A is not
obligatory) is desirable.
We owe these criteria both to Mally himself and to some of this commentators (see
Lokhorst 2008 and Lokhorst 2011).
The nine modules we have mentioned embody insights that were available
around 1930. We confine our attention to these ideas because logicians have put
forward so many proposals since then that we cannot possibly take all of them into
account.
Flexibility of Architecture
The architecture of the robotic reasoning system is flexible (modifiable).
– The non-deontic modules can be turned on and off.
– The deontic and meta-ethical modules are fixed.
Modus Operandi
In order to evaluate the logical modules, module Meta is equipped with theorem
provers and model generators (which produce counterexamples to formulas). These
programs work either concurrently on one processor or in parallel on multiple
processors. If the logic under examination is decidable, then given a formula A,




The Unix shell script displayed in Fig. 1 illustrates this process. The
countermodel generator MaGIC (Slaney 2008) and the theorem prover Prover9
(McCune 2008) run concurrently in the background (as indicated by the ampersand
& at the end of the respective command lines) until one of them terminates. The
value of the argument of sleep is irrelevant because only one of the two programs
can terminate if the inputs to the programs are equivalent, the logical systems are
consistent and the programs work correctly.
The scores for the four reference formulas T1, T2, T3 and D determine whether
module Meta accepts or rejects the logic under examination. Module Meta accepts
the logic as soon as each of the undesirable formulas (T1, T2 and T3) is shown to be
invalid by some countermodel generator and the desirable formula D is shown to be
derivable by some theorem prover. Module Meta rejects the logic it as soon as some
undesirable formula (T1, T2 or T3) is shown to be derivable by some theorem
prover or the desirable formula D is shown to be invalid by some countermodel
generator. Module Meta remains in a state of indecision as long as the logic under
examination has not been accepted or rejected. This state of indecision may last
forever in the case of R and KR because these systems are undecidable. This would
be fatal for a robot on the battlefield or in a hospital, but we have not encountered
this situation in the cases we are examining.
Meta-Ethical Reasoning Process
In the example that we are going to describe, module Meta contains one theorem
prover, namely Prover9 (McCune 2008), and two countermodel generators,
namely Mace4 (McCune 2008) and MaGIC (Slaney 2008). The latter program is
especially suitable in the case of relevant systems, but it was useful for the refutation
of T3 in H as well.
The meta-ethical reasoning process proceeds as follows. The robot starts with
modules ST and Mally. It connects these to module Meta (Fig. 2).Theorem prover
Prover9 quickly derives theorems T1, T2 and T3 and D. The countermodel
generators produce no result. From this, the robot concludes that ST plus Mally is
unacceptable in the light of its meta-ethical standards (see Lokhorst 2010 and
Lokhorst 2011 for the details). This concludes the case of ST. The case of Ł@0 is
Fig. 1 Simple shell script to execute MaGIC and Prover9 concurrently
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more difficult. It takes Prover9 several hours to prove that T1 and T2 are theorems
of Ł@0 plus Mally’s axioms; the derivations of these formulas are about a hundred
lines long. The derivations of T1 and T2 are presented in the Appendix, if only to
demonstrate that it is not advisable to do this kind of reasoning without computer
assistance. The remaining cases (H and the relevant systems) are relatively easy,
both for computers and humans (even though the refutation of T3 in H required
some human ingenuity, as described in Lokhorst 2011).
The results for the seven systems and the four bench-mark formulas are summed
up in the following table, in which ? indicates derivability and - invalidity:
Formula D1–D5 plus
ST Ł@0 H R RM RM3 KR
T1 A ! OA ? ? ? - - - -
T2 OA ! A ? ? - - - ? -
T3 OðA _ BÞ ! ðOA _ OBÞ ? ? - - ? ? -
D OA ! OA ? ? ? - - ? ?
The table shows that only KR is acceptable in view of the meta-ethical standards
employed by the robot.
Conclusion
We have shown that computational meta-ethics is to some extent feasible, using
current, off-the-shelf, generic, freely available open-source software.
The above design of a meta-ethical robot is nothing but a ‘‘proof of concept.’’
Further work is needed. We mention the following themes.
– Different logical systems, both deontic and non-deontic.
– Different theorem-provers and model-generators, for example the award-
winning Vampire and Paradox (Rabe et al. 2009).
– Different meta-ethical criteria, for example, acceptability and unacceptability of
alternative deontic principles. Freedom from ‘‘is-ought fallacies’’ would be an
example. Is-ought fallacies are formulas of the form A ! OB or A ! OB,
where A and B contain no occurrences of O and u. It can be proven that R plus
Mally’s axioms is the only system on our list that avoids such fallacies, but we
doubt whether the computer is clever enough to see this.
Fig. 2 Meta-ethical reasoning process, stage 1: probing Mally and ST
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– Different ways of reasoning about (moral) reasoning, for example in terms of
computational complexity and computational tractability.
– More expressive languages, for example languages with perception, knowledge,
action, multiple agents, strategies, intention and time (see Hoven and Lokhorst
2002 and Lokhorst and Hoven 2011 for further discussion). In this context, it is
interesting to know that large parts of multimodal correspondence theory have
recently been mechanized, which makes it easier to study the interactions of
modalities such as belief, seeing to it that, possibility, obligation and temporal
notions (Georgiev et al. 2006).
– On the fringe of logic and beyond logic: probabilistic reasoning, moral belief
revision, the moral frame problem, non-monotonic reasoning and non-inferential
moral judgment, for example case-based judgment and pattern recognition with
neural networks (see Ga¨rdenfors 2005 for more about these topics).
In other words, the design of a fully fledged meta-ethical robot is still a long way
off. However, developments in the recent past suggest at least one direction in
which we can set out on the long road that lies ahead.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
Proofs of T1 and T2 in system Ł@0 . The derivations were generated by Prover9
(McCune 2008). The symbols can be read as follows:
Derivation of T1: A ! OA.






7 a(x,y) = i(i(x,y),y). [assumption].
Meta-level Object-level
P provable a or
- not b the unconditionally obligatory
| or i implies
= ¼df k and
$F absurd o obligatory
n not
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8 k(x,y) = n(a(n(x),n(y))). [assumption].
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Derivation of T2: OA ! A.






7 a(x,y) = i(i(x,y),y). [assumption].
8 k(x,y) = n(a(n(x),n(y))). [assumption].








16 -P(x) | -P(i(x,y)) | P(y). [assumption].
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